M:\USER\CAMPBELL\ORDERS\SummaryJudgment\Greene.wpd

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

JORDAN ALEXANDER GREENE,§

Plaintiff, §

v. § Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-1624-L

JOE KNIGHT, et al.,§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendants Joe Knight, Richard Hill, Henry Wilkerson and Mike Pierce’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 5, 2007. After careful consideration of the motion,

response, briefs, appendices, reply, record, and applicable law, the court grants in part and denies

in part Defendants Joe Knight, Richard Hill, Henry Wilkerson and Mike Pierce’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiff Jordan Alexander Greene (“Plaintiff” or “Greene”) filed this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Joe Knight (“Knight”), Richard Hill (“Hill”), Henry Wilkerson

(“Wilkerson”) and Mike Pierce (“Pierce”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on September 5, 2006. At

the time of the incident made the basis of this lawsuit, Defendant Knight was a deputy

constable/warrant officer for Hunt County; and Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce were

environmental enforcement officers for Hunt County. This lawsuit arises out of the entry into

Plaintiff’s apartment on July 21, 2006, by Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce and their brief

detention of Plaintiff at his apartment. Plaintiff contends that the entry and brief detention violated

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his right to be free from unlawful and unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants contend that the entry into Plaintiff’s

apartment and his brief detention were lawful and reasonable and that their conduct on the date in

question was objectively reasonable.

The court now sets forth the applicable facts on which it relies to decide the pending

summary judgment motion. The operative facts are largely undisputed. Any material fact in actual

dispute is presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Greene. The standard for deciding the

summary judgment motion is set forth in the following section.

In July 2006, Hunt County Deputy Constable Knight coordinated a warrant roundup for Hunt

County, Texas. In warrant roundups, law enforcement officers from several jurisdictions commonly

work together to locate and arrest various individuals with outstanding arrest warrants.

Two of the outstanding warrants included in this warrant roundup were for a “Jordan Patrick

Greene.” The warrants were for a speeding citation and a failure to appear in court on the speeding

citation. The warrants were issued on April 2, 2004. The speeding offense occurred on October 14,

2002, and the failure to appear occurred on April 2, 2004. Through the crime prevention officer for

the city of Greenville, Defendant Knight acquired a tenant list of persons residing in apartment

complexes in the city of Greenville, and the list disclosed that a “Jordan Greene” was a tenant at the

Sayle Garden Apartments in Greenville, Texas. Other than Plaintiff’s first and last names matching

the first and last names listed in the warrants, Deputy Constable Knight did not have any identifying

information (date of birth, social security number, driver’s license number, middle name, or middle

initial) that the Jordan Greene who lived in the Sayle Garden Apartments could be the same person

named in the two outstanding warrants.

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Early in the morning on July 21, 2006, Defendant Knight held a briefing with local law

enforcement officers regarding the warrant roundup. Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce were

on the warrant roundup team that was assigned to serve the two outstanding warrants on Jordan

Patrick Greene. Defendant Knight was the person responsible for deciding which warrants a team

of officers would attempt to serve. He made the decision to send Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and

Pierce to serve the two outstanding warrants for a Jordan Greene at Plaintiff’s apartment complex,

and provided the address of the apartment complex.

Although Defendant Knight did not see the actual arrest warrants, he checked on the

computer, and the computer revealed that the warrants were for a “Jordan Patrick Greene” and

provided this person’s date of birth, driver’s license number, and Colleyville, Texas, address.

Defendant Knight did not attempt to have the person listed in the warrants served at the Colleyville

address. Defendant Knight did not conduct a check with the Texas Department of Public Safety

(“DPS”) by using the date of birth and driver’s license number of the person named in the warrants

to attempt to determine his current address. Further, Defendant Knight did not check with the

management of the apartment complex to determine whether the “Jordan Patrick Greene” in the

warrants was the person who lived at the apartment complex.

Based on information provided by Defendant Knight, Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce

left the briefing and went to the Sayle Garden Apartments to see whether they could locate the

Jordan Greene who Defendant Knight believed was the subject of the arrest warrants and serve

them. The officers arrived at Plaintiff Greene’s apartment around 6:00 a.m. They knocked on the

door and announced that they were police officers. Keith Gathright opened the door. According

to Gathright, the officers “barged in” and stated that they were there to serve a warrant on Jordan

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The officers’ version, in some key aspects, contradicts that of Gathright. The three officers’ version

is that they went to the apartment where a Jordan Greene was supposed to be living, knocked on the door and

announced themselves as police officers. After some time, a male answered the door, and the officers

identified themselves as police officers and asked the male whether he was Jordan Greene. According to the

officers, the male stated that he was not Jordan Greene; and they inquired whether Jordan Greene lived at the

residence. At that time, Gathright responded affirmatively, stepped back from the door, and pointed toward

a bedroom. The officers stated that their guns were not drawn at anytime during their encounter with

Gathright. The court, for purposes of this summary judgment motion, must of course accept Plaintiff

Greene’s witness’s version of the facts if there are conflicting accounts of what transpired.

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Greene. Gathright states that he was “half-asleep,” and that neither he nor anyone else invited the

officers inside the residence. He further states that the officers had their guns drawn.

Defendant Wilkerson remained near the front door of the apartment, and Defendants Hill and

Pierce proceeded to the bedroom. Greene states that he was awakened by the officers shouting his

name and by their presence in his bedroom. The officers were calling out the name “Jordan Greene”

as they approached the bedroom. According to Plaintiff Greene, Defendants Hill and Pierce “barged

into [his] bedroom” and pointed their weapons at him for “no more than probably 20 seconds.” The

weapons were pointed at Plaintiff Greene until he arose from underneath the bed covers and sat on

the edge of his bed. The officers “holstered their weapons” once his hands were visible. When the

officers entered the bedroom, it was dark, and they used their flashlights until one of them was able

to turn on the lights. The officers told Plaintiff Greene that they had warrants for his arrest and that

he was going to jail. He inquired about the warrants and stated that he had never been in trouble,

and had never received a speeding ticket in Hunt County. Plaintiff Greene told the officers that he

was Jordan Alexander Greene and provided them with his date of birth and driver’s license.

Defendant Pierce made a call on his cell phone, checked the identifying information provided by

Plaintiff against that relevant to the warrants, and discovered that the information pertaining to the

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warrants did not match that provided by Plaintiff Greene. Defendants Hill and Pierce apologized

to Plaintiff Greene for waking and inconveniencing him and left his apartment.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v.

Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact

is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the

nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual

record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Further, a court “may not make

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on motion for summary judgment.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-

55.

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the

nonmoving party’s case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary

judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere

conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to

defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).

Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent

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summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence

in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas,

136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search

of evidence” to support the nonmovant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see

also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

832 (1992). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed

fact issues which are “irrelevant and unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in ruling on a

summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of

proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

III. Qualified Immunity Standard

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to the defense of

qualified immunity, which shields them from suit as well as liability for civil damages, if their

conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A defendant official

must affirmatively plead the defense of qualified immunity. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640

(1980). Defendants have pleaded this defense.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment that raises the defense of qualified immunity,

the court must first decide whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right and,

if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

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violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290

(1999); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991); see also Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339

(5th Cir. 1999). The second prong of the test “is better understood as two separate inquiries:

whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the

incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of

that then clearly established law.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Kerr, 171 F.3d at 339; Evans v. Ball, 168

F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1999); Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998); Eugene

v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1191 (1996).

The court uses the three-step approach in resolving the qualified immunity issue.

Once a public official or officer asserts the defense of a qualified immunity and establishes

that he is acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

rebut this defense by demonstrating that the official’s conduct violated clearly established law.

Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d

261, 265 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Once a public official has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the

burden rests on the plaintiff to rebut it.”). For purposes of resolving this motion, since Defendants

contend that their conduct was objectively reasonable, Plaintiff Greene must establish that

Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.

A right is “clearly established” only when its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable

public official would have realized or understood that his conduct violated the right in issue, not

merely that the conduct was otherwise improper. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987); Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the right must not

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only be clearly established in an abstract sense but in a more particularized sense so that it is

apparent to the official that his actions [what he is doing] are unlawful in light of pre-existing law.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640; Stefanoff v. Hays County, 154 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir.

1998); and Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997).

In Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, the Supreme Court refined the qualified immunity standard

and held that the relevant question is whether a reasonable officer or public official could have

believed that his conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed

by him. If public officials or officers of “reasonable competence could disagree [on whether the

conduct is legal], immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986);

Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.

1994)). Qualified immunity is designed to protect from civil liability “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 341.

Conversely, an official’s conduct is not protected by qualified immunity if, in light of clearly

established pre-existing law, it was apparent the conduct, when undertaken, would be a violation of

the right at issue. Foster, 28 F.3d at 429. To preclude qualified immunity, it is not necessary for

a plaintiff to establish that “the [specific] action in question has previously been held unlawful.”

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. For an official, however, to surrender qualified immunity, “pre-existing

law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the

conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing

violates federal law in the circumstances.” Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d at 882; Stefanoff v. Hays

County, 154 F.3d at 525.

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IV. Analysis

Entry into Plaintiff’s Residence

The existence of a facially valid arrest warrant gives a law enforcement officer the limited

authority to enter that person’s residence and execute the warrant if the officer has “reason to

believe” that the person lives at and is inside the residence. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603

(1980); U.S. v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1997). Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce had

valid arrest warrants for a Jordan Greene. The question to be decided is whether Defendants Hill,

Wilkerson, and Pierce had reason to believe that Jordan Patrick Greene lived at the Sayle Garden

Apartments and was inside at the time they executed the warrants. The court concludes that the

conduct of Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce was objectively reasonable in light of the

information known to them at the time they went to serve the warrants.

Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce proceeded to and entered Plaintiff’s residence based

upon information provided by Defendant Knight. That they did not have the actual warrants in their

possession is of no moment. In the area of law enforcement, it is no secret that law enforcement

officers commonly rely on information provided by other law enforcement officers to perform their

duties. Indeed, little would be accomplished in this area without such reliance and interaction. Such

reliance is objectively reasonable. See Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Tex., 883 F.2d 400, 409-10

(5th Cir. 1989). Moreover, in this case, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Defendants Hill,

Wilkerson, and Pierce were aware of the Colleyville, Texas address as the address for the person

named in the warrants, or that the information provided by Defendant Knight was incorrect. No

facts were presented to them that would have put them on notice that Plaintiff Greene was not the

person named in the warrants or that they were going to the wrong address to attempt to serve the

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warrants. Although Plaintiff’s residence was the wrong residence, the court concludes that

Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce’s actions in relying on information supplied by Defendant

Knight and in attempting to serve the warrants at the address where Plaintiff resided were

objectively reasonable. Stated another way, Plaintiff has not shown that the conduct of the three law

enforcement officers regarding the entry into Plaintiff’s residence was objectively unreasonable.

A reasonablely competent law enforcement officer could have believed that the actions of the three

officers were lawful in light of the information provided to them by Defendant Knight and existing

law. At minimum, officers of “reasonable competence could disagree” whether the conduct of the

three officers was lawful. Accordingly, “immunity should be recognized” under such circumstances.

Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. As their conduct was objectively reasonable, Defendants Hill, Wilkerson,

and Pierce are entitled to summary judgment with respect to the entry into Plaintiff Greene’s

apartment.

B. Officers’ Encounter with Plaintiff

Plaintiff further contends that he was terrorized at gunpoint and that such terror amounted

to a search and seizure conducted in an objectively unreasonable manner in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. The court disagrees.

Plaintiff complains about the detention and weapons being drawn and pointed at him. After

the three officers entered Plaintiff’s residence, two proceeded to his bedroom. The officers pointed

their guns at Plaintiff Greene for, at most, twenty seconds. The officers were at Plaintiff’s residence

to attempt to serve two warrants, and he was briefly detained during the process. As previously

described, the officers, upon verifying key identifying information, discovered that Plaintiff Greene

was not the person named in the warrants. The officers apologized and left Plaintiff’s apartment.

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All of this lasted only a few minutes. A brief detention as set forth under the circumstances herein

simply does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

With respect to Plaintiff’s argument about the reasonableness of the seizure, that is, the

officers pointing their guns at him, the court finds it unavailing. “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence

has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it

the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

A plaintiff’s claim for excessive force must be determined according to Fourth Amendment

standards because “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force – deadly or

not – in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a

‘substantive due process’ approach.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (emphasis in original). The issue

of reasonableness centers on whether the officer’s actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of

the facts and circumstances with which he is faced, without regard to the officer’s underlying intent

or motivation. Id. at 397. Whether the use of force is reasonable “must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at

396. In applying Graham, the Fifth Circuit uses a three-part test that requires a plaintiff to show “(1)

an injury (2) which resulted directed and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the

need (3) and the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 320

(5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir.

2000); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1999); Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-

34 (5th Cir. 1996); Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1993); Knight v. Caldwell, 970

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A person has an absolute right to possess a firearm in his or her home unless that person is a

convicted felon or legally prohibited for some other reason for possessing such firearm; that right, however,

does not trump the right of a law enforcement officer to take precautionary steps to protect and ensure his

safety and that of others during a situation as herein described.

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F.2d 1430, 1432-33 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 926 (1993). Injury means damage or

harm to the physical structure of the body, including diseases that naturally result from the harm.

Knight, 970 F.2d at 1433.

Plaintiff fails to establish, or raise a genuine issue of material fact, that all elements of the

three-part test have been met. Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff suffered a psychological

injury, he does not satisfy the other two elements. Defendants Hill and Pierce were attempting to

serve two warrants. Serving a warrant can quickly escalate into a dangerous situation for the officer

and the person to be served, and this is true whether an officer is serving a misdemeanor or felony

warrant. The officer does not know what to expect; the person to be served may readily comply with

the officer’s instructions, flee, resist and fight, or use deadly force against the officer. In essence,

in any police situation, especially one that is tense, an officer has to be vigilant and prepared for how

a person may react. Plaintiff was asleep when Defendants Hill and Pierce entered into his bedroom;

he was under the bed covers, and the officers could not see his hands. Some persons sleep with a

gun under a pillow, underneath the mattress, in the bed, on a nightstand, or in some other place in

close proximity to the bed. These are locations from which a gun can be readily retrieved and fired

in a few seconds or less.

As the officers could not see Plaintiff Greene’s hands under the cover, the court determines

that the officers pointing their service weapons at Plaintiff Greene for no more than twenty seconds

until he sat on the side of his bed and revealed his hands was not a use of force that was clearly

excessive to the need. The officers did not know whether Plaintiff had a weapon, and although

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pointing their service weapons at him may seem excessive and unreasonable now, the court

concludes that such act, as a matter of law, was not objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances with which the officers were faced.

C. Defendant Knight

Defendant Knight contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct that

resulted in Plaintiff being briefly detained was objectively reasonable. For the reasons herein stated,

the court disagrees.

As Defendant Knight was responsible for sending Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce

to Plaintiff Greene’s apartment to execute the warrants in question, the court focuses on the facts

relevant to Defendant Knight’s determination that Plaintiff’s address was the likely location where

“Jordan Patrick Greene” could be located. In support of his determination, Defendant Knight

provides the following:

Through my training in obtaining my license as a Peace Officer, my

continuing education, and my job on the job experience, I am familiar with the

process of obtaining intelligence for the purpose of serving outstanding arrest

warrants in a county such as Hunt County. By virtue of my training and experience,

I know that many people who are the subject of warrants either (1) give false or

outdated addresses during the traffic stop or other incident forming the basis of the

warrant; (2) move between the date of the underlying incident and the date they are

eventually arrested on the warrant; and/or (3) do not keep the address information

on their driver’s license current. Therefore, many times, the use of more current

intelligence data is the preferred starting point for identifying likely current addresses

for people who are the subject of warrants. This is particularly true when a

significant period of time has passed between the date of the underlying incident and

the date of the warrant round-up. One of the pieces of intelligence data that I

regularly rely upon is lists of tenants residing in various apartment complexes in the

city of Greenville, Texas. I have been using these tenant lists to assist me in locating

persons upon whom arrest warrants need to be served for much of the past five years.

The use of these tenant lists has assisted me in locating at least somewhere between

40-50 persons who have outstanding warrants. In my experience, it has been very

uncommon for the person residing at the address given on the tenant list to not be the

person with the outstanding warrant. However, due to the fact that some names such

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as “John Smith” are relatively common names, I do not utilize the tenant list for

locating persons with such names.

Defendants’ App. 2-3, Affidavit of Joe Knight ¶ 3.

While the court does not necessarily disagree with the overall general assertions made in the

three numbered statements of Defendant Knight’s affidavit, it determines that they exaggerate the

relevant statistics and cannot be applied across-the-board. First, the words “many people” are

meaningless, not placed in proper context, and cause one to make unreasonable assumptions and

inferences. Second, believing what he set forth, Defendant Knight at a minimum should have taken

steps to obtain specific identifying information to determine the address of “Jordan Patrick Greene,”

the person named in the warrants. Rather than even attempt to verify the address listed in the

warrants, Defendant Knight assumed that it was no longer a valid address. Moreover, Defendant

Knight did not check with the DPS to see whether it was still valid. Given the mobile nature of our

society, the longer the passage of time between the date of citation and the date of execution of a

warrant, the more important it becomes to verify the accuracy of key information pertaining to the

person named in a warrant. Further, the court does not find the tenant list to be a reliable source,

unless a date of birth, driver’s license number, social security number, or other specific identifying

information is provided. For example, if the tenant list had contained Plaintiff’s middle name

“Alexander” or the initial “A,” it would have been quite helpful. Without such specific information,

a tenant’s list is only a start, not a means to identify a person named in a warrant. In this case, the

information provided by the tenant list was merely the name “Jordan Greene,” which Defendant

Knight describes as “relatively uncommon.” The court cannot assume that the name “Jordan

Greene” is “relatively uncommon.” While the name is certainly not as common as “John Smith”

or “Robert Brown,” and the surname “Green” is certainly more common than the surname “Greene,”

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this does make the name “Jordan Greene” relatively uncommon. The court cannot say that

Defendant Knight’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

The court’s holding is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Deep East

Texas Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2004). In Johnson, a deputy

sheriff provided the information in “bust-out” packages for a task force to execute warrants against

several suspects. The deputy sheriff relied on jail records and offense reports for a particular

suspect’s address, 419 Otis Street. The record reflects that the suspect actually gave this location

as his address when he was arrested earlier on another charge nine months before the warrant

roundup. On March 9, 2001, when the task force officers attempted to serve the warrant, the suspect

did not live at the location provided by the deputy sheriff; a 67 year-old lady resided at the Otis

Street address. The task force officers entered this residence, detained the 67 year-old lady, and

searched the house for the wanted person who, unbeknownst to the officers, no longer lived there.

Moreover, on March 9, 2001, there was no evidence that records of the jail or Sheriff’s Department

listed, or even suggested, any address for the suspect other than that on Otis Street where the 67

year-old lady resided. The court held that under these facts it was objectively reasonable for the

deputy sheriff to rely on these records, and he was therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at

302-04.

In Johnson, the suspect, by his own admission, had lived at the wrongfully searched

residence as late as July 2000. In this case, Defendant Knight had no evidence that Jordan Patrick

Greene had ever lived at the Sayle Garden Apartments. He did know that Jordan Patrick Greene,

based on the last known address, lived at the Colleyville address, yet he did nothing to check the

status of this information.

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Plaintiff Greene has carried his burden as to Defendant Knight’s conduct. Given the totality

of the circumstances surrounding Defendant Knight’s conduct in directing Defendants Hill,

Wilkerson, and Pierce to the Sayle Garden Apartments, the court cannot conclude that he is entitled

to qualified immunity. His conduct requires further explanation and facts before the court can

conclude that it was not objectively unreasonable. At this juncture, the court cannot determine that

officers of reasonable competence could differ on the lawfulness of Defendant Knight’s conduct in

directing Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce to execute the warrants at Plaintiff Greene’s

residence. As genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Defendant Knight’s conduct,

summary judgment is not appropriate. Defendant Knight may ultimately prevail on this issue;

however, it is to be resolved by a jury, not the court. The three officers would have never gone to

Plaintiff Greene’s residence to execute a warrant but for Defendant Knight’s conduct and his

instructions.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact

exists as to the objective reasonableness of the conduct of Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce.

The court determines that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether Defendant

Knight’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the court grants Defendants Joe Knight,

Richard Hill, Henry Wilkerson and Mike Pierce’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants

Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce, and denies the motion as to Defendant Knight. Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Hill, Wilkerson, and Pierce are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant Knight will proceed to trial unless earlier resolved.

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Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 17

VI. Pretrial Conference

A pretrial conference is scheduled for Friday, February 1, 2008, at 3:00 p.m. To avoid

unnecessary expense to the parties and counsel, the court will conduct the pretrial conference

telephonically. Plaintiff’s counsel is responsible for setting up the conference call to the court.

It is so ordered this 29th day of January, 2008.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge

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