4
On the other hand, local governments are considered “persons” that are obligated to comply
with the requirements of the TCPA.
Moreover, contractors of any level of government are
“persons” as defined by the TCPA, so must comply with the TCPA’s consent obligations.
This
applies to contractors even if they are agents of the government.
The Commission noted that
federal contractors might qualify for derivative immunity when making calls on behalf of the federal
government, but it left that question for courts to determine.
Nevertheless, as explained in Section III of these comments, it appears that the called
parties’ provision of their telephone numbers during enrollment brings the callers within the scope
of Commission rulings that treat the provision of a telephone number to the caller or an
intermediary in relation to the subject of the call as prior express consent to receive automated calls
or texts at that number. While we do not endorse those rulings,
we recognize that, if they are
See Broadnet Order, supra note 4, at ¶ 29.
See id. at ¶ 14 (“We find that a federal contractor is a ‘person’ under section 227(b)(1). The term ‘person’ as
used in the TCPA and defined in the Communications Act expressly includes an ‘individual, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, trust, or corporation’ ‘unless the context otherwise requires.’ Every federal
contractor, including those acting as agents, falls within one of these categories. And, unlike the federal
government itself, there is no longstanding presumption that a federal contractor is not a ‘person.’ Nor do we
find any ‘context that otherwise requires’ us to ignore the express language of the Communications Act’s
definition of the term ‘person’ in this situation.”). See also id. at 22 (“[S]tate contractors, like their federal
counterparts, are ‘person[s]’ under that provision.”).
See id. at ¶ 14. It is important to note that the calls described in the HHS letter do not qualify as “calls made
by, or on behalf of, healthcare providers” that are exempt from the consent requirements for automated calls
to cell phones for two reasons: 1) These calls “are strictly limited” to calls for specific purposes, which do not
include enrollment issues (47 C.F.R. §64.1200(a)(9)(iv)(C)); and 2) only calls that are free to the called party
are eligible for the exemption allowed these calls (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C)).
See Broadnet Order, supra note 4, at ¶ 15.
We do not agree that the simple provision of a telephone number constitutes the “prior express consent”
as required by the TCPA. As explained in comments filed by NCLC in 2017, the Commission’s interpretation
of this requirement is hard to justify, and we have urged the Commission to rule that the actions of the called
party that are deemed to be “prior express consent” must actually be express, as opposed to implied, and that
those actions must also provide explicit consent to receive autodialed and/or artificial voice or prerecorded
calls to a specified cell phone number. See, e.g., In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer
Prot. Act. of 1991 et al., Comments in Support of the Petition for Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket Nos. 02-
278 & 05-338 (Mar. 8, 2017), available at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/file/download/DOC-56ac3512f8c00000-
A.pdf?file_name=Comments%20in%20support%20of%20Petition%20on%20Consent.pdf.