UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
In the Matter of:
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and
J.P. Morgan Securities plc,
Respondents.
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CFTC Docket No. 22-07
ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 6(c) AND (d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT, MAKING
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) has reason to believe that
from at least July 2015 to the present (“Relevant Period), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities plc (collectively, JPMorgan or
Respondents”) violated, as set forth below, Sections 4g, 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(g)(1) and (3), and
4s(h)(1)(B) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6g, 6s(f)(1)(C), 6s(g)(1), (3),
6s(h)(1)(B), and Commission Regulations (“Regulations”) 1.31, 1.35, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1),
(b)(1), 23.602, and 166.3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 1.35, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1), (b)(1), 23.602 (2020),
17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2021). Therefore, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public
interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to determine
whether Respondents engaged in the violations set forth herein and to determine whether any
order should be issued imposing remedial sanctions.
In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondents have
submitted an Offer of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept.
Respondents admit the facts set forth in Section II below, acknowledge that their conduct
violated the Act and Regulations and consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Proceedings
Pursuant to Section 6(c) and (d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings, and
Imposing Remedial Sanctions (“Order”), and acknowledge service of this Order.
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Respondents consent to the use of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Order in this proceeding and
in any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party or claimant, and agree
that they shall be taken as true and correct and be given preclusive effect therein, without further proof.
RECEIVED CFTC
Office of Proceedings
Proceedings Clerk
7:16 am, Dec 17, 2021
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II. FINDINGS
The Commission finds the following:
A. SUMMARY
The Act and Regulations impose recordkeeping and supervision requirements on
Commission registrants to ensure that they responsibly discharge their crucial role in our
markets. Compliance with these requirements is essential to the Commission’s efforts to
promote the integrity, resilience, and vibrancy of the U.S. derivatives markets through sound
regulation.
During the course of a Commission investigation into certain of JPMorgan’s trading,
Commission staff issued subpoenas to JPMorgan for certain communications. The Division
learned, based on communications received from a third party, that JPMorgan traders had been
using personal text messages and WhatsApp to communicate. Moreover, certain of those
communications were responsive to the Commission’s subpoenas. JPMorgan did not collect, or
maintain, its employees’ messages over unapproved channels on personal devices.
Consequently, JPMorgan did not produce those responsive communications to the Commission.
In or about April 2021, Commission staff brought the use of unapproved communication
methods by certain of JPMorgan’s traders to JPMorgan’s attention. Thereafter, JPMorgan
notified Commission staff that the firm was aware of widespread and longstanding use by
JPMorgan employees of unapproved methods to engage in business-related communications.
The Commission’s subsequent investigation with respect to JPMorgan employee use of
unapproved methods of communication revealed that, during the Relevant Period, JPMorgan
employees, including those at senior levels, communicated both internally and externally on
unapproved channels, including via personal text messages and WhatsApp messages. These
written communications were sent and received by JPMorgan employees and included messages
related to JPMorgan’s businesses as Commission registrants that were required to be maintained
under Commission-mandated recordkeeping requirements. None of these written
communications were maintained and preserved by JPMorgan, and they were not able to be
furnished promptly to a Commission representative when requested. As a result, JPMorgan
violated, as set forth below, Sections 4g, 4s(f)(1)(C) and 4s(g)(1) and (3) of the Act and
Regulations 1.31, 1.35, 23.201, and 23.202(a)(1) and (b)(1).
In addition, the widespread use of unauthorized communication methods by JPMorgan’s
employees to conduct firm business violated JPMorgan’s own policies and procedures, which
prohibited such communications. JPMorgan did not maintain adequate internal controls with
respect to business-related communications on non-approved communication methods. Indeed,
Respondents do not consent, however, to the use of this Order, or the findings or conclusions herein, as the sole
basis for any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party or claimant, other
than: a proceeding in bankruptcy or receivership; or a proceeding to enforce the terms of this Order. Respondents
do not consent to the use of the Offer or this Order, or the findings or conclusions in this Order, by any other party in
any other proceeding.
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some of the very same supervisory personnel at JPMorgan responsible for ensuring compliance
with JPMorgan’s policies and procedures themselves utilized non-approved methods of
communication to engage in business-related communications, in violation of firm policy.
Because JPMorgan failed to implement a diligent supervisory system to ensure compliance with
Commission recordkeeping requirements and the firm’s own policies and procedures, and
because the widespread use of unauthorized communication methods resulted in the firm’s
failure to maintain Commission-required records, JPMorgan failed to diligently supervise
matters related to its business as a Commission registrant in violation of Section 4s(h)(1)(B) of
the Act and Regulations 166.3 and 23.602, as set forth below.
B. RESPONDENTS
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a national banking association with its main office in
New York City. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is provisionally registered with the Commission
as a swap dealer and provides consumer finance, investment banking, commercial banking, and
other services.
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC is a limited liability company with its principal place of
business in New York City. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC is registered with the Commission as a
Futures Commission Merchant (“FCM) and is provisionally registered with the Commission as
a swap dealer.
J.P. Morgan Securities plc is a company with its principal place of business in London,
England. J.P. Morgan Securities plc is provisionally registered with the Commission as a swap
dealer.
C. FACTS
During the course of a Commission investigation into certain of JPMorgan’s trading,
Commission staff issued subpoenas to JPMorgan for specified communications. Separately,
Commission staff obtained communications from a third party that reflected numerous text and
WhatsApp messages to or from JPMorgan employees that occurred over unapproved channels on
those employees’ personal devices. Although certain of the communications between the
JPMorgan employees and the third party were responsive to the Commission’s subpoenas,
JPMorgan did not collect those messages or produce them to the Commission because the
messages were sent or received through non-JPMorgan-approved communication methods on
those employees’ personal devices. Commission staff only learned of the communications from
a third party. Commission staff were additionally aware, based on the information obtained from
the third party, that some JPMorgan employees no longer possessed communications that had
been sent or received by non-approved methods.
Upon learning of these communications, Commission staff notified JPMorgan that the
Commission was aware that certain of JPMorgan’s traders had communicated via unapproved
communication methods, including personal text and WhatsApp messages, that were apparently
not surveilled and maintained by JPMorgan. In response to Commission staff’s questions
regarding JPMorgan employees’ use of unapproved channels on those employees’ personal
devices, JPMorgan notified Commission staff that the firm was aware of the widespread and
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longstanding use by JPMorgan employeesincluding senior-level employeesof unapproved
methods to engage in business-related communications.
Importantly, during the Relevant Period, JPMorgan policies and procedures broadly
prohibited employees from using non-approved methods, such as personal text messages and
WhatsApp, to engage in business-related communications. And certain JPMorgan policies
explicitly stated that the policies are to be applied consistently with applicable Commission rules
or regulations, specifically referencing 1.31 and 23.202(a)(1).
Messages sent through JPMorgan-approved communications methods were monitored,
subject to review, and when appropriate, archived. By contrast, messages sent using unapproved
communication methods, including over WhatsApp, email, and text messages on personal
devices, were not monitored, subject to review, or archived.
As a result of JPMorgan’s failure to ensure that employeesincluding supervisors and
senior-level employees—complied with the firm’s communications policies and procedures,
JPMorgan failed to maintain thousands of business-related communications in connection with
its commodities and swaps businesses, and thus failed diligently to supervise its businesses as
Commission registrants. These supervision failures resulted in the widespread use of non-
approved methods of communication by many JPMorgan employees in violation of the firm’s
policies and procedures, as well as a widespread failure to maintain certain records required to be
maintained pursuant to Commission recordkeeping requirements.
An analysis, for example, of the three traders whose communications that were the
subject of Commission subpoenas in the investigation noted above illustrates the breadth of
JPMorgan’s supervision and recordkeeping failures. An analysis of just those three custodians
reveals the frequent use of non-approved methods to communicate with brokers and market
participants. Further, those three traders’ communications revealed that dozens more JPMorgan
employees (including numerous supervisors, managing directors, and executive directors)
conducted firm business on unapproved channels (including in hundreds of text and WhatsApp
messages). Certain of these communications constituted records that were required to be kept
pursuant to Commission recordkeeping requirements, and none of the communications were
preserved and maintained by JPMorgan.
JPMorgan’s recordkeeping and supervision failures were firm-wide and involved
employees at all levels of authority. Moreover, employees’ use of unapproved communication
methods was not hidden within the firm. To the contrary, certain supervisorsthe very people
responsible for supervising employees to prevent this misconductroutinely communicated
using unapproved channels on their personal devices. In fact, managing directors and senior
supervisors responsible for implementing JPMorgan’s policies and procedures, and for
overseeing employees’ compliance with those policies and procedures, themselves failed to
comply with firm policies by communicating using non-firm approved methods on their personal
devices about the firm’s Commission-regulated businesses.
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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plc’s Failure to Maintain Required Records in Violation of Section
4s(f)(1)(C) and 4s(g)(1) and (3) of the Act and Regulations 23.201(a)(1),
23.202(a)(1), and 23.202(b)(1)
Section 4s(f)(1)(C) of the Act obligates swap dealers to keep books and records of all
activities related to its business as a swap dealer . . . in such form and manner and for such period
as may be prescribed by the Commission by rule or regulation and those books and records
must be kept open to inspection and examination by any representative of the Commission.” 7
U.S.C. § 6s(f)(1)(C); see also Section 4s(g)(1) and (3) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6s(g)(1), (3)
(requiring swap dealers to keep daily trading and counterparty records). These statutes are
implemented, among other places, at Regulations 23.201(a)(1), 23.202(a)(1), and 23.202(b)(1),
17 C.F.R. § 23.201(a)(1), 23.202(a)(1), 23.202(b)(1) (2020).
Regulation 23.201(a) obligates a swap dealer to keep full, complete, and systematic
records, together with all pertinent data and memoranda, of all its swaps activities,” including
“[r]ecords of each transaction, including all documents on which transaction information is
originally recorded.” Regulation 23.202(a)(1) and (b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 23.202(a)(1), (b)(1)
(2020), requires, in relevant part, every swap dealer to keep daily trading records of all swaps
and related cash and forward transactions it executes including, specifically, a record of oral and
written communications provided or received concerning quotes, solicitations, bids, offers,
instructions, trading, and prices that led to the execution of a swap transaction or the conclusion
of a related cash or forward transaction.
During the Relevant Period, as a result of the widespread employee use of unapproved
communication methods, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P.
Morgan Securities plc failed to maintain Commission-required transaction records and pre-
execution communications. By this conduct, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities plc violated Sections 4s(f)(1)(C) and 4s(g)(1) and (3)
of the Act and Regulations 23.201(a)(1), 23.202(a)(1), and 23.202(b)(1).
B. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC’s Failure to Keep Required Records in Violation
of Section 4g of the Act and Regulation 1.35
Section 4g of the Act requires FCMs and other registrants to create and keep books and
records pertaining to transactions and positions in such form and manner and for such period as
may be required by the Commission. 7 U.S.C. § 6g. Regulation 1.35(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. §
1.35(a)(1) (2020), sets forth some of the books and records that are required to be created and
maintained by FCMs. Specifically, an FCM must:
(i) Keep full, complete, and systematic records . . . of all transactions relating to
its business of dealing in commodity interests . . . which shall include all orders
(filled, unfilled, or canceled), . . . and all other records, which have been prepared
in the course of its business of dealing in commodity interests . . . .
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(iii) Keep all oral and written communications provided or received concerning
quotes, solicitations, bids, offers, instructions, trading, and prices that lead to the
execution of a transaction in a commodity interest . . . whether transmitted by
telephone, voicemail, facsimile, instant messaging, chat rooms, electronic mail,
mobile device, or other digital or electronic media . . . .
With the exception of pre-trade communications, all such records are required to be kept in a
form and manner that allows for the identification of a particular transaction.” Regulation
1.35(a)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a)(5) (2020).
As a result of the widespread use of unapproved methods of communication by firm
employees, which communications were not preserved and maintained, J.P. Morgan Securities
LLC failed to keep full, complete, and systematic records of all transactions relating to its
business of dealing in commodity interests, in violation of Section 4g of the Act and Regulation
1.35.
C. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plc’s Failure to Keep Records in Required Manner in Violation of
Regulation 1.31
Regulation 1.31(b)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 1.31(b)(4) (2020), requires that registrants keep all
books and records that are required to be maintained under the Act and Regulations in such
manner as to make themreadily accessible for a period of two years for paper records and for
the duration of the retention period for electronic records. Upon request of the Commission, all
of these documents are required to be promptly produced. Regulation 1.31(d), 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.31(d) (2020). Regulation 23.203(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 23.203(b)(1) (2020), requires that
records required to be kept pursuant to Part 23 of the Regulations, be kept in accordance with
Regulation 1.31, 17 C.F.R. § 1.31 (2020).
By failing to keep all Commission-required records in such a manner as to make them
readily accessible, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plc violated Regulation 1.31. In addition, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. violated
Regulation 1.31 by not promptly producing such communications upon request in connection
with the Commission’s investigation, as described above.
D. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plcs Failure to Supervise Diligently in Violation of Section
4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act and Regulation 23.602(a)
Section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(1)(B), requires diligent supervision of
the business of the registered swap dealer[.] Regulation 23.602 requires that each swap dealer
shall establish and maintain a system to supervise, and shall diligently supervise, all activities
relating to its business performed by its partners, members, officers, employees, and agents (or
persons occupying a similar status or performing a similar function). 17 C.F.R. § 23.602(a)
(2020). The operative language of Regulation 23.602 is similar to the language of the
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Commission’s longstanding supervision regulation for futures and options, Regulation 166.3,
17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2021).
Under Regulation 23.602, a violation is demonstrated by showing either that: (1) the
registrants supervisory system was generally inadequate; or (2) the registrant failed to perform
its supervisory duties diligently. See In re Commerzbank AG, CFTC No. 19-03, 2018 WL
5921385, at *10-11 (Nov. 8, 2018) (consent order) (noting textual similarities between
Regulation 23.602 and Regulation 166.3, applying case law concerning Regulation 166.3, and
citing In re Murlas Commodities, Inc., CFTC No. 85-29, 1995 WL 523563, at *9 (Sept. 1, 1995),
and In re Paragon Futures Assoc., CFTC No. 88-18, 1992 WL 74261, at *14 (Apr. 1, 1992)); In
re INTL FCStone Markets, LLC, CFTC No. 15-27, 2015 WL 4980321, at *3 (Aug. 19, 2015)
(consent order) (same). Evidence of violations that “‘should be detected by a diligent system of
supervision, either because of the nature of the violations or because the violations have occurred
repeatedly, is probative of a failure to supervise.” In re Société nérale Int'l Ltd., CFTC No.
19-38, 2009 WL 4915485, at *7 (Sept. 30, 2019) (consent order) (quoting In re INTL FCStone
Markets, 2015 WL 4980321, at *3).
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities
plc failed to supervise their swap dealer business activities diligently during the Relevant Period.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities plc failed
to maintain an adequate supervisory system to ensure that employees did not utilize non-
approved methods to engage in communications relating to firm business, including the swap
dealer business. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plc’s failure to supervise is demonstrated by their failure to detect, prevent, and
remediate repeated violations of the Commission’s recordkeeping requirements and firm policies
and procedures. Supervisory personnel failed to ensure that employees complied with the
Commission’s recordkeeping requirements and firm communications policies and in some
instances themselves violated the policies. These supervision failures also resulted in the failure
to keep and maintain Commission-required records, the failure to maintain the records in such a
manner as to make them readily available, and the failure to produce the records promptly upon
request. By this conduct, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P.
Morgan Securities plc failed to supervise diligently their officers, employees, and agents, in
violation of Section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act and Regulation 23.602(a).
E. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC’s Failure to Diligently Supervise in Violation of
Regulation 166.3
Regulation 166.3 states:
Each Commission registrant, except an associated person who has no supervisory
duties, must diligently supervise the handling by its partners, officers, employees
and agents (or persons occupying a similar status or performing a similar
function) of all commodity interest accounts carried, operated, advised or
introduced by the registrant and all other activities of its partners, officers,
employees and agents (or persons occupying a similar status or performing a
similar function) relating to its business as a Commission registrant.
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17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2021).
A violation under Regulation 166.3 is an independent violation for which no underlying
violation is necessary. See In re Collins, CFTC No. 94-13, 1997 WL 761927, at *10 (Dec. 10,
1997). A violation of Regulation 166.3 is demonstrated by showing either that: (1) the
registrant’s supervisory system was generally inadequate; or (2) the registrant failed to perform
its supervisory duties diligently. In re Murlas Commodities, Inc., CFTC No. 85-29, 1995 WL
523563, at *9 (Sept. 1, 1995); Sansom Refining Co. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., CFTC No.
82-R448, 1990 WL 282783, at *11 (Feb. 16, 1990) (noting that, under Regulation 166.3,
registrants have duty to develop procedures for the detection and deterrence of possible
wrongdoing by [their] agents” (internal quotation omitted)); In re GNP Commodities, Inc., CFTC
No. 89-1, 1992 WL 201158, at *17-19 (Aug. 11, 1992) (providing that, even if an adequate
supervisory system is in place, Regulation 166.3 can still be violated if the supervisory system is
not diligently administered); see also In re Rosenthall Collins Grp., LLC, CFTC No. 12-18, 2012
WL 1242406, at *6 (Apr. 12, 2012) (consent order) (respondent failed to perform supervisory
duties diligently by not following its compliance procedures that were in place). Evidence of
violations that “should be detected by a diligent system of supervision, either because of the
nature of the violations or because the violations have occurred repeatedly is probative of a
failure to diligently supervise. In re Paragon Futures Assoc., CFTC No. 88-18, 1992 WL 74261,
at *14 (Apr. 1, 1992) (“The focus of any proceeding to determine whether Rule 166.3 has been
violated will be on whether [a] review [has] occurred and, if it did, whether it was ‘diligent.’”).
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC failed to supervise its business as a Commission registrant by
failing to maintain adequate supervisory systems to ensure that employees complied with
Commission recordkeeping requirements and firm policies and procedures that prohibited
business-related communications on non-approved methods of communication. The inadequacy
of J.P. Morgan Securities LLC’s supervisory systems is demonstrated by the longstanding and
repeated violations of the Commission’s recordkeeping regulations and firm policies and
procedures, including by supervisory personnel, and the fact that the supervisory failures resulted
in the repeated failure to maintain Commission-required records, to ensure that the required
records were readily accessible, and that the records could be promptly produced upon request.
By this conduct, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC failed to supervise diligently its officers,
employees, and agents in violation of Regulation 166.3.
IV. FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that, during the Relevant Period,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities plc
violated Sections 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(g)(1) and (3), and 4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
6s(f)(1)(C), 6s(g)(1), (3), 6s(h)(1)(B), and Regulations 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1) and (b)(1), and
23.602, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1), (b)(1), and 23.602 (2020); and J.P. Morgan
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Securities LLC violated Section 4g of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6g, and Regulations 1.35 and 166.3, 17
C.F.R. § 1.35 (2020), 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2021).
V. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT
Respondents have submitted the Offer in which they:
A. Acknowledge service of this Order;
B. Admit the facts described in Section II above and acknowledge that their conduct
violated the Act and Regulations;
C. Admit the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to all matters set forth in this
Order and for any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based
on violation of or enforcement of this Order;
D. Waive:
1. The filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing;
2. A hearing;
3. All post-hearing procedures;
4. Judicial review by any court;
5. Any and all objections to the participation by any member of the Commission’s
staff in the Commission’s consideration of the Offer;
6. Any and all claims that they may possess under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5
U.S.C. § 504, and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and/or the rules promulgated by the
Commission in conformity therewith, Part 148 of the Regulations, 17 C.F.R.
pt. 148 (2021), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding;
7. Any and all claims that they may possess under the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, §§ 201253, 110
Stat. 847, 85774 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), relating to, or arising from, this proceeding;
and
8. Any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding or the
entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any
other relief, including this Order;
E. Stipulate that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely of the
findings contained in this Order to which Respondents have consented in the Offer; and
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F. Consent, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission’s entry of this Order that:
1. Makes findings by the Commission that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities plc violated Sections 4s(f)(1)(C),
4s(g)(1) and (3), and 4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6s(f)(1)(C), 6s(g)(1), (3),
6s(h)(1)(B), and Regulations 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1) and (b)(1), and 23.602, 17
C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1), (b)(1), and 23.602 (2020); and J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC violated Section 4g of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6g, and Regulations 1.35
and 166.3, 17 C.F.R. § 1.35 (2020), 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2021).
2. Orders JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan
Securities plc to cease and desist from violating Sections 4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(g)(1) and
(3), and 4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act, and Regulations 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1) and
(b)(1), and 23.602; and J.P. Morgan Securities LLC to cease and desist from
violating Section 4g of the Act and Regulations 1.35 and 166.3.
3. Orders Respondents to pay, jointly and severally, a civil monetary penalty in the
amount of seventy-five million US dollars ($75,000,000), plus post-judgment
interest within fourteen days of the date of entry of this Order;
4. Orders Respondents and their successors and assigns to comply with the conditions
and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set forth in Part VI of this Order;
and
5. Represents that it has engaged in a review of certain recordkeeping failures and
begun a program of remediation.
6. Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer.
VI. ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
A. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities
plc and their successors and assigns shall cease and desist from violating Sections
4s(f)(1)(C), 4s(g)(1) and (3), and 4s(h)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6s(f)(1)(C),
6s(g)(1), (3), 6s(h)(1)(B), and Regulations 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1) and (b)(1), and
23.602, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 23.201, 23.202(a)(1), (b)(1), and 23.602 (2020); and J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC and its successors and assigns shall cease and desist from
violating Section 4g of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6g, and Regulations 1.35 and 166.3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.35 (2020), 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2021).
B. Respondents shall pay, jointly and severally, a civil monetary penalty in the amount of
seventy-five million US dollars ($75,000,000) (“CMP Obligation), within fourteen days
of the date of the entry of this Order. If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full within
fourteen days of the date of entry of this Order, then post-judgment interest shall accrue
on the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be
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determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this Order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
Respondents shall pay the CMP Obligation and any post-judgment interest by electronic
funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check, or bank
money order. If payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the
payment shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent
to the address below:
MMAC/ESC/AMK326
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Division of Enforcement
6500 S. MacArthur Blvd.
HQ Room 181
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
(405) 954-6569 office
(405) 954-1620 fax
9-AMC-AR-CFTC@faa.gov
If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondents shall contact Jamie
Stovall or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall
fully comply with those instructions. Respondents shall accompany payment of the CMP
Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the paying Respondent and the name and
docket number of this proceeding. The paying Respondent shall simultaneously transmit
copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW,
Washington, D.C. 20581;
C. Respondents and their successors and assigns shall comply with the following conditions
and undertakings set forth in the Offer:
1. JPMorgan.
a. JPMorgan shall conduct:
i. A comprehensive review of JPMorgan’s supervisory, compliance, and
other policies and procedures designed to ensure that JPMorgan’s
electronic communications, including those found on personal
electronic devices, including without limitation, cellular phones
(“Personal Devices”), are preserved in accordance with the
requirements of the Act, the Regulations, and JPMorgan’s policies and
procedures.
ii. A comprehensive review of training conducted by JPMorgan to ensure
personnel are complying with the requirements regarding the
preservation of electronic communications, including those found on
Personal Devices, in accordance with the requirements of the Act and
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the Regulations, and JPMorgan’s policies and procedures, including by
ensuring that JPMorgan personnel certify in writing on a quarterly
basis that they are complying with preservation requirements.
iii. An assessment of the surveillance program measures implemented by
JPMorgan to ensure compliance, on an ongoing basis, with the
requirements found in the Act, the Regulations, and JPMorgan’s
policies and procedures to preserve electronic communications,
including those found on Personal Devices.
iv. An assessment of the technological solutions that JPMorgan has begun
implementing to meet the record retention requirements of the Act, the
Regulations, and JPMorgan’s policies and procedures, including an
assessment of the likelihood that JPMorgan personnel will use the
technological solutions going forward and a review of the measures
employed by JPMorgan to track employee usage of new technological
solutions.
v. An assessment of the measures used by JPMorgan to prevent the use
of unauthorized communications methods for business
communications by employees. This assessment should include, but
not be limited to, a review of the firm’s policies and procedures to
ascertain if they provide for any significant technology and/or
behavioral restrictions that help prevent the risk of the use of
unapproved communications methods on Personal Devices (e.g.,
trading floor restrictions).
vi. A review of JPMorgan’s electronic communications surveillance
routines to ensure that electronic communications through approved
communications methods found on Personal Devices are incorporated
into JPMorgan’s overall communications surveillance program.
vii. A comprehensive review of the framework adopted by JPMorgan to
address instances of non-compliance by JPMorgan employees with
JPMorgans policies and procedures concerning the use of Personal
Devices to communicate about JPMorgan business in the past. This
review shall include a survey of how JPMorgan determined which
employees failed to comply with JPMorgan policies and procedures,
the corrective action carried out, an evaluation of who violated policies
and why, what penalties were imposed, and whether penalties were
handed out consistently across business lines and seniority levels.
b. Within forty-five (45) days after completion of the review set forth in sub-
paragraphs a.i. through a.vii. above, JPMorgan shall submit a detailed written
report of its findings to the Commission staff (the Report). The Report shall
include a description of the review performed, the names of the individuals
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who performed the review, the conclusions reached, and a summary of the
plan for implementing the recommended changes in or improvements to
JPMorgan’s policies and procedures.
c. JPMorgan shall adopt all recommendations contained in the Report within one
hundred and thirty-five (135) days of the date of the Report.
d. The Report will likely include confidential financial, proprietary, competitive
business or commercial information. Public disclosure of the reports could
discourage cooperation, impede pending or potential government
investigations or undermine the objectives of the reporting requirement. For
these reasons, among others, the reports and the contents thereof are intended
to remain and shall remain non-public, except (1) pursuant to court order; (2)
as agreed to by the parties in writing; (3) to the extent that the Commission
determines in its sole discretion that disclosure would be in furtherance of the
Commission’s discharge of its duties and responsibilities; or (4) is otherwise
required by law.
2. One-Year Evaluation: JPMorgan shall assess its program for the preservation, as
required under the Act, Regulations, and JPMorgan’s policies and procedures, of
electronic communications, including those found on Personal Devices, commencing
one year after submitting the Report required by Paragraph 1.b above. JPMorgan
shall require this review to evaluate JPMorgan’s progress in the areas described in
Paragraph 1.a.i-vii above. After this review, JPMorgan shall submit a report (the
One Year Report) to the Commission staff and shall ensure that the One Year
Report includes an updated assessment of JPMorgan’s policies and procedures with
regard to the preservation of electronic communications (including those found on
Personal Devices), training, surveillance programs, and technological solutions
implemented in the prior year period.
3. Reporting Discipline Imposed: For two years following the entry of this Order,
JPMorgan shall notify the Commission staff as follows upon the imposition of any
discipline imposed by JPMorgan, including, but not limited to, written warnings, loss
of any pay, bonus, or incentive compensation, or the termination of employment, with
respect to any employee found to have violated JPMorgan’s policies and procedures
concerning the preservation of electronic communications, including those found on
Personal Devices: (1) at least 48 hours before the filing of a Form 8-T; or (2) within
ten (10) days of the imposition of other discipline.
4. Recordkeeping: JPMorgan shall preserve, for a period of not less than six (6) years
from the end of the fiscal year last used, the first two (2) years in an easily accessible
place, any record of compliance with these undertakings.
5. Public Statements: Respondents agree that neither they nor any of their successors
and assigns, agents or employees under their authority or control shall take any action
or make any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or
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conclusions in this Order or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this
Order is without a factual basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision
shall affect Respondents’: (1) testimonial obligations; or (2) right to take legal
positions in other proceedings to which the Commission is not a party. Respondents
and their successors and assigns shall comply with this agreement, and shall
undertake all steps necessary to ensure that all of their agents and/or employees under
their authority or control understand and comply with this agreement.
6. Cooperation, in General: Respondents shall cooperate fully and expeditiously with
the Commission, including the Commission’s Division of Enforcement, in this action,
and in any current or future Commission investigation or action related thereto.
Respondents shall also cooperate in any investigation, civil litigation, or
administrative matter related to, or arising from, this action.
7. Partial Satisfaction: Respondents understand and agree that any acceptance by the
Commission of any partial payment of Respondents’ CMP Obligation shall not be
deemed a waiver of their obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order,
or a waiver of the Commission’s right to seek to compel payment of any remaining
balance.
8. Deadlines: For good cause shown, Division staff may extend any of the procedural
dates relating to the undertakings. Unless otherwise specified, deadlines for
procedural dates shall be counted in calendar days, except that if the last day falls on
a weekend or federal holiday, the next business day shall be considered to be the last
day.
9. Change of Address/Phone: Until such time as Respondents satisfy in full their CMP
Obligation as set forth in this Order, Respondents shall provide written notice to the
Commission by certified mail of any change to their telephone numbers and mailing
addresses within ten calendar days of the change.
The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date.
By the Commission.
______________________________
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick
Secretary of the Commission
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Dated: December 17, 2021