16 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Blog
as a lawful weapons carrier is not a specially protected class and
shares little in common with the listed protected classes—it is
difficult to argue that they should be among the classes that cannot
be used as a basis for exclusion.
90
Additionally, tickets essentially
serve as contracts between the event host and the attendee.
91
The
principle of freedom of contract may allow the private event holder
to condition attendance on accepting the temporary firearm ban on
the premises.
92
Private attendees would be free to either agree to that
term while present at the ticketed event, or not attend.
93
However,
contract provisions that are prohibited by statute are generally illegal
and therefore void.
94
Because section 16-11-127 lays out guidelines
for the lawful carry of weapons, contract provisions further limiting
firearm carry may be prohibited by the Code and thus impermissible
by law.
95
Commentators assert that GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. stands for the
proposition that no short-term lease can convey to a private party an
estate in public property that would allow the lessee to ban guns on the
90. See ATLANTA, GA., CODE § 142-3(e). Lawful weapons carrying requires the physical carrying of
a weapon and is not a “status” in the way that race, color, creed, religion, gender, domestic relationship
status, parental status, familial status, sexual orientation, national origin, political affiliation or gender
identity are. Id. See also GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 186-2-.02 (1992). The Georgia Fair Housing Law
prohibits discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin,
which overlaps heavily with the statuses listed in the Atlanta Code. Id.
91. Ga. Lottery Corp. v. Patel, 826 S.E.2d 385, 388–90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that a lottery
ticket did constitute a contract where the elements of offer, acceptance, mutual assent, and consideration
via price paid were all present). Although Georgia courts have not yet extended this holding to event
tickets or explored the specific ramifications of doing so, the holding implies that when offer, acceptance,
mutual assent, and consideration are present, the purchasing of a ticket constitutes the formation of a
contract. See id.
92. Parrish v. St. Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 874 S.E.2d 413, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022) (citing
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 495 S.E.2d 66, 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)) (“Competent parties are
free to choose, insert, and agree to whatever provisions they desire in a contract unless prohibited by
statute or public policy.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127 (West 2022). In the case of contracting against
firearm carry, such a provision may be found to be directly prohibited by section16-11-127 of the Georgia
Code, which authorizes firearm carry on public property. Id.
93. See Parrish, 874 S.E.2d at 419.
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-1 (West 2022) (“A contract to do an immoral or illegal thing is void. If the
contract is severable, however, the part of the contract which is legal will not be invalidated by the part of
the contract which is illegal.”); Parrish, 874 S.E.2d at 419.
95. See sources cited supra note 94.